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The Signal Provision of Emotion:  
Using Emotions to Enhance Reliability Via Sensemaking 
 
Abstract 
High reliability organization (HRO) theory suggests that early detection of and swift responses to 
potentially hazardous and situation changing events in organizational environments is central to 
the sustainability of reliable operations.  Limited research on HRO’s (e.g. military groups and 
firefighters) considers how normative demands on feeling and emotion help to explain why some 
events are recognized and responded to while others not. In this article, we propose a model of 
enactment of anomalous events (i.e., situation changing events) that considers the manner in 
which emotions are regulated in high reliability contexts and how this influences the extent to 
which early indicators of anomalous events are heeded or dismissed.  In this article, we seek to 
provide a theoretical framework for explaining both the enabling mechanisms by which emotions 
may function as a signaling resource in the detection of anomalous events and the constraining 
mechanisms through when emotion regulation processes may inhibit reliability.  We discuss 
implications of the model for researchers and practitioners in high reliability organizations. 
 
Keywords: signal function of emotion, emotion regulation, sensemaking, high reliability 
organizing, structure 
ENACTMENT AND EMOTION 
 
 
3 
The Signal Provision of Emotion:  
Using Emotions to Enhance Reliability via Sensemaking 
“A forestry crew of 6 and I were on a forest fire. The fire started out small. When we 
arrived we saddled up and started the attack. The dozer operator was a retired forest 
ranger and a long friend of my family. He cut the dozer line to the top of the hill. We 
were planning out the attack and he said ‘Guys, something doesn’t feel right. I’m going 
to get off the hill and you should come too.”’ (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 
 
The ability of members to quickly and predictably collaborate in response to ambiguous, 
unanticipated events in the environment is a hallmark characteristic of high reliability 
organizations (HROs). In police departments, hospital emergency rooms, fire departments, 911 
call centers, and military combat units, reliability is more important than efficiency or 
profitability (Creed and Stout and Roberts, 1993). Groups and teams in successful HROs develop 
and continuously refine understandings and awareness in problem situations that are ambiguous, 
emergent, and complex—open to myriad interpretations of problem definition, decision criteria, 
and solution viability (Weick, 1995, 2001; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Recent HRO scholarship has attempted to identify phenomena thought to contribute to 
reliability. Whether conceptualized as “heedful interrelating,” “complex interaction,” 
“mindfulness” or “collective mind,” scholarship has attempted to identify modes of interaction 
more often associated with reliable operations that facilitate responsiveness to initial signs of 
danger, which are often ambiguous, open to interpretation, and easily dismissed (Cooren, 2004; 
Scott and Trethewey, 2008; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliff and Obstfeld, 2005; 
Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Curiously absent from this work has been a thorough consideration 
of the role of emotion and emotion regulation processes (e.g., feeling and display rules) in 
enabling and constraining the capacity of high reliability actors to properly heed these early 
signals of danger. Since high reliability organizations often feature feeling and display rules 
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(e.g., don’t get people alarmed about hunches, never show fear) that would seem to inhibit 
heedful detection of anomalous events, this absence is particularly concerning. In this article, we 
contend that HRO theory would improve through a better understanding of the role of normative 
emotion rules in enabling and constraining whether anomalous events are properly 
acknowledged and appraised during the most embryonic stages of a crisis. If these subtle cues of 
danger are properly enacted in the earliest stages while they are still manageable, then costly 
errors, disasters, and crises can be prevented or minimized. 
In proposing our theory of the signal provision of emotion in HRO contexts, we first 
define and discuss the importance of emotions and the signal provision of emotion as an 
untapped behavioral resource for increasing reliability of operations.  We then discuss 
sensemaking in high reliability organizations and connect the signal provision of emotion to this 
important group process in organizations.  This leads to the primary contribution of the article, a 
multi-level model of the enactment of anomalous events and propositions related to the model.  
The purpose of introducing this model is to demonstrate the importance of the individual-level 
signal provision of emotion in promoting effective collective appraisal processes in high 
reliability settings.  Building off of recent understanding of emotion in the workplace (Waldron, 
2012), we define the signal provision of emotion (SPE) as the properties of emotions that aid 
individuals and groups in interpreting, appraising, and making sense of anomalous events that 
occur in the environment.  Finally, we conclude by discussing theoretical and practical 
contributions of the proposed model as well as potentials methods for testing the model 
empirically. 
Before moving forward, we should note that the process our framework describes is one 
that may involve individual phenomena (e.g., individual subjectivity--feelings, interpretations 
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and emotional displays or non-displays) but that for the most part emerges in interaction at the 
group level. That is, a group is more or less heedful of anomalous events not merely because an 
individual or two noticed something and acted on it (or failed to) due to individual differences 
but rather because of patterns of emotion regulation or disregulation that emerge between 
members and are maintained at the group level. Although it may be tempting to relate the model 
we propose here to what some scholars refer to as emotional intelligence (e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 
1997), the phenomena we describe here are not the property of individuals but rather of groups.  
Specifically, emotional intelligence is defined as “the capacity to reason about emotions, and of 
emotions to enhance thinking. It includes the abilities to accurately perceive emotions, to access 
and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, 
and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth” (Mayer 
& Salovey, 2004).  Thus, emotional intelligence is more about an individual’s ability to use 
emotions rather than the property of emotions to signal individuals (i.e. SPE).  The focus of this 
paper is upon the signal provision of emotion and how that impacts group-level processing as 
well as some of the many individual-level constraints upon the signal provision.  However, a 
host of other individual differences are likely meaningfully connected to the signal provision of 
emotion and some of these, including emotional intelligence, are discussed in the implications 
for research section.  
Emotions as signals in the intersubjective appraisal process 
The framework developed in this article is grounded in the HRO theoretical assumption 
that groups who effectively appraise anomalous events via interaction (intersubjectivity) may be 
more likely to heedfully enact the event (Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
However, we assert that processes at the individual level, specifically the signal provision of 
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emotion, impacts the extent to which the group engages in intersubjective appraisal.  We first 
discuss these individual level processes in an attempt to understand how they contribute to 
intersubjective appraisal in a manner that more reliably enacts anomalous events and improves 
organizational operations. We use the remainder of the paper to present a series of theoretical 
propositions that we believe should be considered in future empirical work. As Whetten (1989; 
491-493) notes, such propositions are most useful when the intended purpose of an article is to 
present a new theoretical position. But as Whetten further notes, even though good propositions 
specify how future research might test the authors’ core arguments, they are often a bit more 
abstract and thus less falsifiable than hypotheses because they specify broad, anticipated 
relationships among constructs, not among lists of variables. Propositions are converted into 
more specific, falsifiable hypotheses in subsequent empirical work.  
The important and fairly direct link between the management of emotion and reliability 
concerns the way that emotion signals people to action as they attempt to interpet and adapt to 
their environments.  For the purpose of this study, emotions are the subjective feelings typically 
directed at an object that include the cognitive appraisals of and biological reactions to the object 
(Cornelius, 1996).  Hochshild (1983) described emotion labor as a process in which employees 
are expected to display and/or feel specific emotions in order to conform to organizational role 
expectations. Consistent with Hochschild and others (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995), we see 
emotion processes as socially constructed means of interpreting the world. Hochshild described 
how emotions have a signal provision—cuing us to environmental events.  For example, 
emotions may signal danger.  Hochshild describes a study that compared women who escaped 
attempted sexual assaults and those that were actual rape victims (Queens Bench Foundation, 
1976).  What differentiated members of these two groups was the tendency of non-victims to act 
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on their early perceptions of danger and the propensity of victims to ignore these very signals.  
This is related to Freud’s (1923) argument that anxiety serves as a signal of environmental 
danger.  These dangers may range from the physical to the symbolic or even ethical.  Recently, 
Waldron (2012) expanded the notion of emotions as signals to include the idea that emotions can 
suggest moral jeopardy, moral decay, and even face threat. Specifically, Waldron argues that 
feelings of anxiety and guilt may be signs that “personal or organizational moral codes are 
threatened” (p. 133). 
Signals such as these are typically interpreted through comparison with individual and 
collective expectations. When individuals’ expectancies are violated by an affective event (e.g. 
an event that generates emotional and/or affective reactions, see Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), 
they may or may not act on them, and others in the same environment may not even perceive 
such violations or know that other group members perceived them. Peers, supervisors, and 
subordinates may need to be informed or convinced. Intersubjective appraisal is needed to 
acknowledge that there is a seeming discrepancy between what two or more people are seeing 
and what they would typically expect. The example of Comair flight 191 serves to illustrate: Just 
before sunrise on 27 August 2006, Comair flight 191 crashed during takeoff from Bluegrass 
Field in Lexington, Kentucky. Investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(National, 2006) concluded that the plane took off from the wrong runway, which was half the 
length of the runway the pilots had been told to use. Data from the jet’s flight recorder indicated 
that air traffic control cleared the jet to depart from illuminated runway 22 but the pilot instead 
turned the plane onto runway 27, which was unlit. During takeoff, the co-pilot commented to the 
pilot, “That is weird with no lights.” The lead pilot responded affirmatively, “Yeah.” The pilots 
did not abort takeoff and the plane crashed a few second later, killing 49 people. In this case, the 
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co-pilot noticed that the runway was not lit as it normally would be before sunrise. He also 
communicated his observation of this abnormality to the pilot, albeit with a seemingly low level 
of urgency. This comment—a weak signal—was not enough to catalyze heedful intersubjective 
processing that an important expectation had not been met and something was seriously amiss. 
Heedfulness occurs when people intersubjectively detect and collectively respond both strongly 
and swiftly to weak cues that an expectation has been violated. In this example, a stronger 
emotional response in both interpretation and expression of the unmet expectation (missing 
runway lights) would likely have prevented this disaster and others like it. Incorporating the 
signal provision of emotion may be one way to enhance the intersubjective appraisal processes 
that occur in groups/teams like this flight crew.  Thus, enhancing the signal provision of emotion 
among individuals in risky contexts may also enable them to attend to weak signals and 
intersubjectively appraise the crisis accurately. 
Defining the signal provision 
Given the forgoing arguments, we argue that the signal provision emotion is critically 
important to high reliability organizations that regularly deal with high levels of risk and 
environmental turbulence. HROs need to monitor their environments in sophisticated ways for 
unmet expectations and respond early and actively to deviations even when there are only weak 
signals to do so (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  This would suggest that HROs would benefit from 
members whose signal provision of emotion (SPE) remains active and functional.  As previously 
indicated, we define the signal provision of emotion (SPE) as the properties of emotions that aid 
individuals and groups in interpreting, appraising, and making sense of anomalous events that 
occur in the environment (Waldron, 2012). The SPE is a functional property of emotion 
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stemming from the assumption that emotions give rise to appraisals of the object or event that 
initiated the emotional experience (Lazarus, 1991). 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2006) contend that stability of attention is the mechanism through 
which the SPE impacts behavior. Stability of attention is “the percentage of ascertaining 
moments that are directed at the intended object rather than at some other object” (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2006: 519).  As more ascertaining moments are directed at an object or anomalous 
event, the more stable the attention and the more likely that the event is enacted. According to 
the vignette that opened this article, one crewmember appeared to have attended to and enacted 
cues from the environment that other crewmembers had not.  Had all the crewmembers heeded 
the feeling communicated by this crewmember, a near miss would likely have been avoided. 
Thus, the SPE is highly beneficial for individuals and groups in HROs because it assists 
in the avoidance of “floating away” from the object or event. Such distractions significantly 
increase the likelihood that the event will be ignored and not heedfully enacted (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2001). It is generally agreed that floating away (i.e. deviation of attention) is a primary 
causal factor in organizational accidents (Turner, 1994). When a discrepancy or violation of 
expectations occurs, that violation becomes the object/event of attention. According to Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2006), “this object is often glossed over, normalized, and treated as if it were a 
familiar event already encountered, named, and understood in the past” (p. 519). These processes 
(e.g. normalization of emotion) discourage the stability of attention and encourage floating away 
from the violated of expectation (i.e. anomalous event). Thus, the ability of emotion to serve as a 
signal impacts individual “floating away” from the anomalous event, the likelihood that 
sensemaking will move from an individual to intersubjective appraisal process, and the proper 
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enactment of a violated expectation by the group.  For these reasons the following proposition is 
furthered: 
Proposition 1: The signal provision of emotion is positively related to intersubjective 
appraisal processes such that a stronger, more reliable signaling provision in individuals 
is likely to result in enhanced group-level detection of anomalous events.  
Enactment of anomalous events model 
Weick and colleagues have employed elements of sensemaking theory (Weick, 1979, 
1995, 2001) and case study analysis to analyze how HRO members manage this challenge 
(Weick, 2001; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).  Sensemaking proceeds through a cycle of three 
interdependent processes, termed enactment, selection and retention. First, when members notice 
ambiguous change in their environment, they bracket off some portion of the available 
information for further attention and interpretation (enactment) rather than attempting the 
impossible task of analyzing all available information cues (Weick, 2001). Then, they 
improvisationally propose and refine interpretations of the information they have enacted such 
that certain interpretations become increasingly compelling to the group (selection) (Weick and 
Daft, 1983). Finally, interpretive schemes applied in a given episode of sensemaking are retained 
and applied in future equivocal contexts (retention) (Weick and Bougon, 2001). In this paper, we 
tease out how emotion is a key and under theorized part of the first stage of sensemaking, 
enactment, particularly in HRO contexts. We propose that organizational rules designed to shape 
or restrict emotion (e.g., “don’t show fear”) can significantly constrain and potentially enable 
enactment processes.  
In an attempt to explain the contribution of emotion processes to the enactment of 
anomalous events in organizations, we propose a model that incorporates the way groups 
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intersubjectively appraise anomalous events (i.e., at the group level) and how this process is 
directly impacted by the felt emotions among the individuals (i.e., individual level) in the groups 
(see Figure 1).  Similar to the work of Ashkanasy (2003), we acknowledge the multi-level impact 
of emotion processes as individuals and groups intersubjectively appraise anomalous events.  To 
begin, it is important to understand that appraisal refers to the evaluation of some focal object or 
event and is often associated with determining the valence and nature of the object/event 
(Lazarus, 1984).  In the context of high reliability organizational theorizing, appraisals also 
include evaluations of the seriousness of risks associated with a particular event or object 
(Covello, 1992; Kasperson et al., 1987). During the appraisal process, individuals experience 
physiological arousal if the event violates their expectations (Burgoon & Hale, 1988), which 
calls their attention to the event and suggests an interruption of ongoing activity (Mandler, 1984). 
Confronted with the violation, people begin to elaborate upon what the violation may mean for 
them and the work at hand via group interaction. These appraisals, however, occur collectively 
or intersubjectively in organizations as individuals/groups discuss what is occurring or has 
occurred rather than as a purely individually subjective, cognitive process.  That is, groups 
collectively attempt to understand and assign meaning to the event through appraising the nature 
of the event.  This iterative, cyclical process requires communication, interaction, and openness 
to experiences that are often related to the emotionality of the group (Weick, 1995).  Thus, 
instead of a single individual determining the nature of the violated expectation, the group 
collectively determines if anomalous event actually positively or negatively violates the groups’ 
understanding of the situation through their interaction with one another. 
Anomalous events and intersubjective appraisal 
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Positive and negative violations refer to the valence of the unexpected event (Burgoon & 
Hale, 1988).  An event that positively violates expectations usually is simply an exaggerated 
event compared to the expectation. For example, if a house fire were to burn faster than usual, 
firefighters would consider this a positive violation. They would develop and reinforce this 
appraisal through their communication with one another. Firefighters already expect houses to 
burn quickly, so a fire that burns even faster than expected only amplifies the belief that house 
fires spread fast.  In contrast, an event that negatively violates expectations contradicts the 
general belief about what should happen and suggests something is not as it should be (Weick, 
1995).  For example, if when responding to a house fire, the home suddenly explodes rather than 
merely intensifying gradually, then this contradicts standard expectations of a typical house fire 
and suggests that something is different about this situation.  Thus the valence of the anomalous 
event determines the extent to which individuals and groups will find the event salient.  Events 
are perceived as salient to the group to the extent that they violate the group’s expectations about 
normal operations in their context. Thus, the salience of the anomalous event is a crucial factor in 
individuals/groups’ intersubjective appraisal of it.  The more salient the anomalous event is to 
the group (i.e. the more it violates the group’s expectations), the more likely the appraisal 
process will move from internal cognitive appraisal to intersubjective collective communicative 
sensemaking and continue through towards heedful or heedless enactment.  The following is 
proposed: 
Proposition 2: A positive relationship exists between the salience of anomalous events 
and the intersubjective appraisal processes among groups. 
Intersubjective appraisal and heedful enacting 
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 Maintaining our focus on the upper part of the model that emphasizes group level 
processing, when intersubjective appraisal occurs, groups can heedfully enact the event or 
disregard the event (Weick & Sutcliff 2007). As previously indicated, intersubjective appraisal 
process in groups refers to the extent to which the group considers the valence, nature, and 
riskiness associated with an anomalous event. If the group disregards the event, this is not to 
suggest that the groups are unaware of the anomalous event and associated expectancy that was 
violated. Rather, heedless enactment occurs as members in high reliability organizations actively 
ignore or minimize the event (e.g., a fire alarm) due to, for example, organizationally prescribed 
rituals and norms (Scott & Trethewey, 2008). For example, victims of home fires are often 
hysterical as the firefighters continue to fight the blaze rather than attend to them. Rather than 
heedfully enacting and moving attention toward the victim, firefighters may maintain attention to 
their assigned task (e.g., soak the fire, run the engine, protect other properties, etc.) because of 
longtime norms and habits. Under these circumstances, heedless enactment is the act of ignoring 
the victim even though awareness of their concerns is often unavoidable. It is also possible that 
the victim is trying to call attention to a child still trapped inside the house. In that case, the 
emotion signals from the victim may be constrained by the expectations of the organization (i.e., 
to ignore distress and maintain stability of attention on extinguishing the fire) thereby preventing 
attention to the most urgent need, rescuing the child. The anomalous event here is in the form of 
the hysterical victim who is upset by more than just the prospect of losing property in the house 
fire, which is the typical expectation. The desired response, of course, would be the heedful 
enactment of the expectancy violations through the intersubjective appraisal processes (e.g., 
making each other aware of the fact that this hysterical plea is important and warranted). Thus, 
the following proposition is suggested:  
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Proposition 3: A positive relationship exists between intersubjective appraisal processes 
and heedful enactment. 
Anomalous events and individual emotion 
Having focused primarily at the group-level and how the SPE impacts intersubjective 
appraisal processes, we now turn to how individual emotional experiences influence the 
experience of the SPE.  Two key theoretical assumptions must be made.  First, anomalous events 
often arouse emotions in individuals and second, individuals engage in emotion regulation as 
they experience emotions on a daily basis.  
Beginning with the first assumption, emotions are complex psychological and 
physiological experiences involving physiological arousal, expressive behaviors, and conscious 
experience (Myers, 2004). Emotion is typically affiliated with mood, temperament, personality, 
disposition, and motivation (Gaulin and McBurney, 2003).  Among other consequences, 
emotions and their subsequent reactions arbitrate life quality. We express emotion during every 
moment of every day – in the conversations with our friends, in the processing of directions from 
our supervisors, and in explaining why we are 15 minutes late for a date. Often times, emotions 
are experienced when we perceive that something is imminently going to affect our welfare 
(Ekman, 2003). Many scientific accounts of emotion assume that emotions are initiated by 
physical processes in the brain or body and therefore can be explained by events that transpire in 
the physical world (Frackowiak, 2004). 
 Affective events theory provides a substantial and credible explanation for why 
employees experience emotions (Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996).  Events in one’s environment 
provide proximal causes for affective reactions and the subsequent emotions provide some 
indication of the nature of the events transpiring around individuals.  According to Weiss and 
ENACTMENT AND EMOTION 
 
 
15 
Cropanzano (1996), “things happen to people in work settings and people often react emotionally 
to these events. These affective experiences have a direct influence on behaviors and attitudes…” 
(p.11). Affective events theory demonstrates that employees react emotionally to things that 
happen to them at work and that this influences their job performance and satisfaction.  Taken a 
step further, we propose that workplace events cause emotional reactions among individuals and 
these emotional reactions impact both the individuals’ and their groups’ understanding of the 
event through intersubjective appraisal.  Further, sensemaking theory asserts that things/events 
do not just happen to people, they are enacted, bracketed off, and interpreted in groups (Weick, 
1995).   
Individual emotions and regulation 
 Concerning the second assumption, emotional regulation is “how individuals influence 
which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them” 
(Gross, 1998: 542).  According to Gross (1998), emotion regulation can be automatic or 
controlled as well as conscious or unconscious.  Further, emotion regulation can occur at 
multiple points in the emotion generative process, thus allowing someone to experience more or 
less of the symptoms of an emotion relative to the regulatory demands placed upon them.  
Concerning why individuals regulate emotion, organizational policies, peer pressure, and societal 
expectations (i.e. culture) are all examples of socially constructed phenomena that define what an 
emotion is and how people should emotionally react.  Research shows that individuals regulate 
both emotional expression and inner feeling (Gross, 1998).  
Gross identified two types of emotion regulation: antecedent-focused and response-
focused regulation (Totterdell and Holman, 2003). Antecedent-focused emotion regulation refers 
to changing initial feelings by adjusting the situation or thoughts about the situation (Grandey 
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and Fisk and Steiner, 2005). For example, firefighters are often excited to attack the fire and are 
looking forward for the opportunity to show their skills.  They engage in antecedent-focused 
emotion regulation when they change those feelings of excitement and enthusiasm in order to 
empathize with the victim who has lost property in the fire (Scott and Myers, 2005).  
Response-focused emotion regulation refers to changing one’s behavior once the emotion 
is experienced by suppressing, faking, or amplifying the response. Using the same example, if 
the firefighter simply suppresses their excitement and attempts to show concern and 
understanding for the victim through the outward expression of empathy, they are engaged in 
response-focused emotion regulation.  Suppressing is the idea that individuals can hide the 
feelings they are experiencing by bottling them inside whereas amplifying would suggest that the 
individual enhances the emotion they are experiencing.  Thus, the theoretical assumption 
grounded in previous research (e.g. Gross, 1998; Grandey, 2003; etc.) is that individuals 
experience emotions and regulate them. 
Emotion regulation in HROs 
Despite the importance of SPE for making appropriate appraisals in high reliability 
organizations, members of HROs face several structural challenges to their need to preserve the 
signal provision.  In short, members must rely on the signal provision while simultaneously 
being asked to manage, stifle or control their emotions. For example, ethnographic studies of 
firefighting, police work, and military settings have demonstrated that organizational norms and 
socialization processes encourage employees to regulate emotions such as fear, distress or anger 
(Katz, 1990; Myers, 2004; Scott and Myers, 2005). In other words, normative emotion regulation 
demands in those environments often require that individuals ignore affective responses to their 
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environments. Specifically, what many HRO jobs have in common is the normative expectation 
to stifle emotion (e.g., fear), rather than amplify or express certain emotions.   
Indeed, a range of HRO settings feature emotional expectations that would seem to 
dampen the signal provision.  For example, employees such as flight attendants (Murphy, 1998) 
and cruise ship activities staff (Tracy, 2000) are expected to preserve safety and communicate 
risk to crew members and passengers, yet emotion labor remains an important, if not central, 
facet of their work (Hochshild, 1983). What’s more, members of these occupations regularly 
engage in drills that hone their emergency response skills but may weaken unintentionally their 
ability to sense deviations because the repeated exposure to the focal hazardous stimulus 
desensitizes them to signals they should attend (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).  For example, 
firefighters engage in training drills where they put out fires in a training facility, enter the 
burning training facility to retrieve a mock victim, and where full protective gear to simulate real 
fire situations.  By engaging in these repetitive simulations and following orders given by 
superiors in a systematic way, individuals may learn important skills but nevertheless begin to 
ignore emotional cues leading them to attend to an anomalous event.  In these controlled 
situations, normalizing of emotion (felt and expressed) that calls attention to the anomaly is 
desirable.  However, the subsequent desensitization that occurs may also suppress the signal 
provision of emotion in other contexts. 
 As organizations regulate employee emotion through policies and procedures (Grandey, 
2000), employees may learn that they are not supposed to show certain emotions (e.g. fear or 
anger).  Simultaneously, emotion regulation as dictated by organizations may also sensitize 
employees to certain emotional cues (e.g. dissatisfied facial cues of customers) while ignoring 
others (Gross, 1998).  At times, this identification of organizationally prescribed emotion cues 
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and suppression of emotion may serve an adaptive function.  For example, if an employee 
experiences a negative customer service interaction, suppression helps employees avoid 
becoming distraught.  Such an outburst would reflect negatively on the employee and the 
organization, thus avoiding such behavior is of primary interest to both parties.  However, the 
suppression of such negative emotion makes it simultaneously unavailable as a signal that might 
help people to adequately and heedfully enact information. 
 When people learn not to feel, they turn off an important way of knowing and making 
sense of the world (Cornelius, 1996; Frijda, 1994; Weick, 2001).  The stoic firefighter may not 
experience anger or fear, though they may be natural and useful responses to situations faced 
each day on the job.  Without anger, they may not be moved to see or enact information that 
indicates imminent threat.  Without fear, they may not enact information that indicates danger.  
As the pressure to subdue and regulate emotion increases, the benefits of experiencing emotion 
(e.g., fight or flight, stability of attention, etc.) are lessened and the possibility of continued 
reliable operations becomes suspect.  In other words, the signal provision of emotion enhances 
the intersubjective appraisal process, which leads to more accurate enactment of anomalous 
events.  When organizations suppress the signal provision of emotion, they may reduce the 
accuracy of enactment and therefore cause operations to be less reliable, decrease the detection 
of hazards, and increase the possibility of unsafe workplace incidents.  The following is 
proposed:  
 Proposition 4: Emotional regulation (i.e. suppression of alarm-based emotions) is 
negatively related to the signal provision of emotion. 
Affective structure: constraining or enhancing the signal provision of emotion 
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Given the nature of anomalous events and the key role of emotions in organizations, we 
now turn attention to the way that the SPE is enhanced or constrained by affective structure in 
organizations. Individuals and groups are capable of experiencing a wide range of emotions that 
impact their attitudes and behaviors within the organization context (Weiss and Cropanzano, 
1996; Cornelius, 1996). The presence or absence of certain types of affective structure (e.g. 
formal and informal) can decrease or increase this range, thus enhancing or constraining the 
ability of emotions to signal anomalies and spur appropriate action. Unfortunately, little is 
known as to how these structures enable or constrain the SPE that could improve life in the HRO 
workplace (Lovaglia and Houser, 1996).  
Informal “affective” structure 
Informal affective structure can be thought of as the unspoken rules and norms within the 
organization that govern emotion laden behavior between members of the organization and when 
members interact with the public (Van Maanen and Kunda, 1989; Grandey, 2003; Ashforth and 
Kreiner, 2002; Scott and Myers, 2005). Ashforth and Kreiner (2002) identify four processes for 
normalizing or managing emotions in organizations that fall into the category of informal 
affective structure. These processes are common to many organizations that view emotion as 
problematic and irrational (Putnam and Mumby, 1993; Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995). They 
include: (1) diffusing, where the impact of less desirable emotions is dissipated or reduced, (2) 
reframing, where emotions or the affective event are reinterpreted in a way that forestalls, 
redefines, or renders them acceptable, (3) adaptation, which capitalizes on the idea that repeated 
exposure to the affective event reduces the emotional impact, and (4) ritualism, where the 
process of enacting standardized procedures provides a greater sense of control and thereby 
reduces emotions. Normalizing emotion in this way significantly constrains the signal provision 
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of emotion by increasing emotion regulatory processes in individuals, thus reducing the attention 
paid to the anomalous event. As individuals feel that they are expected to experience certain 
types of emotion and avoid others, the range of emotion cues for which they are allowed to 
attend is limited (Diefendorff and Richard, 2003; Ashforth and Kreiner, 2002). For example, new 
“booter” firefighters report feeling fear or anxiety as they enter a burning building early in their 
career (Scott and Myers, 2005). Various rituals and activities (such as belittling the new “booter” 
for moments of expressed distress), however, serve to normalize their gut emotional responses. 
Through these activities, firefighters, over time, reframe and re-evaluate their emotions (i.e. 
normative emotion regulation)—transforming fear to excitement, stoicism, or anticipation. This, 
in turn, blunts the signal provision of fear and plays a role in reinterpreting the event in ways that 
may be problematic (e.g. that fire really isn’t that dangerous). Because emotion normalizing 
processes reduce the range of emotions experienced by individuals by increasing emotion 
regulation, the viability of the SPE is decreased.  Thus, the following proposition is offered: 
Proposition 5: Normalizing of emotions (i.e. diffusing, reframing, adaptation, ritualism, 
and peer pressure) in an organization is positively related to emotion regulation. 
Formal “affective” structure  
In addition to informal normalization of emotions, more formal structures, in terms of 
recorded material and documentation, also affect the viability of the SPE. Examples of formal 
structure may include employment contracts, procedure manuals, work processes, organizational 
hierarchy, evaluation tools, and technology (Scott, 2003; Barley, 1990; Diefendorff and Richard, 
2003; Diefendorff and Richard and Gosserand, 2006; Wilk and Moynihan, 2005). McPhee 
(1985) explains that formal structures are 1) explicitly stated and available to all authorized 
persons; 2) prescriptive, telling what the organization should be like and indicating ways to 
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ensure the ideal; and 3) refer to members of the organization and describe their activities, roles, 
and behavior while working for the organization. 
Thus, any description of the type of emotion that an organization wants to communicate 
to the customer or public would be considered formal affective structure. For example, Tracy 
(2000) discussed the service credo that cruise ship crewmembers with safety responsibilities 
were required to carry in their wallet, wear as a lapel pin, and see plastered on the walls in 
employee only areas. The credo mandated that employees should never say no, smile all the time 
because they are “on stage”, and recognize that they are ambassadors of the cruise ship at all 
times. Given the fact that these same employees were also emergency officers on the ship, it 
seems plausible that, in fact, these employees may have to say “no” to passengers and not smile 
in emergency situations.  However, given the ways employees were socialized, rewarded and 
punished, cheery emotional fronts became the norm.   
Such overt prescriptions of appropriate emotional expression, as described in the cruise 
ship study above, exemplify the types of affective structure within organizations that maintains 
and constrains emotional expression. As previously stated, individuals engage in emotional work 
in response to the organizational demands placed upon them for particular types of expressions 
(Rafaeli and Sutton, 1990). These demands by the organization are display rules placed upon the 
employee (Grandey, 2000). Ekman (1973) stated that display rules are standards of expression 
that indicate which emotions are appropriate for the situation and how these emotions are 
supposed to be conveyed to the public. When coworkers actually follow these policies and 
communicate their acceptance of the policies, then the affective structure becomes the normative 
culture of the organization. Also, the self-monitoring and self-censoring that occurs when 
powerful members of the organization are present during organizational events is an example of 
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the ways in which formal affective structure potentially constrains emotional expression. As the 
constraints on emotional expression increase, emotion regulation increases and the likelihood of 
enjoying the benefits of the SPE are reduced. Thus the presence of formal display rules will 
increase the level of emotion regulation and therefore constrain the SPE. The following 
propositions are furthered: 
Proposition 6: Formal affective structure (e.g. overt descriptions of appropriate emotional 
expression, perceived presence of powerful members of the organization, perception of 
display rules) in an organization is positively related to emotion regulation occurring in 
individuals. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this article was to describe how emotions enter the process of enactment 
of anomalous events in high reliability organizations. Through this discussion we highlighted 
how anomalous events impact individual emotions, attitudes, and behaviors (Ashkanasy, 2003). 
By extending these ideas to the group level, we propose that the signal provision of emotion that 
is active at the individual level, may provide an important adaptive property to be used in group 
level intersubjective appraisal process, but is often overlooked by high reliability organizations. 
As future research investigates the propositions outlined above, an understanding of the nature of 
the signal provision of emotion will provide insights into the way that individuals and groups 
make sense of anomalous events. As researchers explore these relationships, the importance of 
deregulating emotions in organizations may gain momentum in high reliability organizations as 
they attempt to remain reliable in an ever changing and dangerous environment. Even if minimal 
reductions to the formal and informal affective structures in these organizations only marginally 
reduces overall failures and increases attention to weak signals through the signal provision of 
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emotion, then the changes will be worth the effort.  We conclude the article with a discussion of 
potential avenues for investigating the propositions outlined as well as implications for both 
research on emotion in HROs as well as implications for practice. 
Future Directions 
 One key component to any good theory article is providing some general ideas and 
guidance for investigating that theory (Weick, 1989; Sutton and Staw, 1995).  Our primary 
concern is to illustrate that the forgoing propositions are worthy of further investigation and 
through doing so, some useful conclusions can and should be drawn.  In order to begin to 
investigate the propositions, some preliminary actions need to be considered.  As an example, 
some method for assessing the signal provision of emotion must be developed before any 
variable analytic research can feasibly be undertaken.  Measurement development researchers 
illustrate that sometimes the initial steps in measurement development include engaging in 
qualitative research methods to uncover the nature of a phenomenon (Jick, 1979).  In the case of 
the signal provision of emotion, it might be first useful to consider engaging in observation, 
participant observation, interviews, and focus groups with individuals in high reliability 
organizations to begin to investigate the nature of emotion in these contexts.  After elaborating 
upon the signal provision of emotion in this manner, variable analytic measures should be 
developed following current conventions (Guion, 2011). 
 After developing a measure of the signal provision of emotion, several of the propositions 
in the model are more easily investigated.  For example, proposition four suggests that emotion 
regulation is negatively related to the signal provision of emotion.  That is, the more emotion 
regulation required of individuals, the less likely that emotions they experience will allow them 
to attend to weak signals in their environment.  A simple test of this idea would be to ask 
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workers in a high reliability context to assess their emotion regulation and their signal provision 
of emotion using survey methods.  At the same time, individuals could provide information 
concerning the presence of formal and informal affective structure and thus, allow for the test of 
a mediated model where formal/informal affective structure predicts emotion regulation which 
then predicts the signal provision of emotion.   
 Alternatively, the model could be investigated more comprehensively through field 
observation where a researcher engages with the environment where these processes are likely to 
occur.  For example, a researcher could shadow a firefighting crew over the course of some 
defined period of time and observe the intersubjective appraisal processes (Scott and Trethewey, 
2008).  Through individual and focus group interviews with individuals engaged in the 
intersubjective appraisal process, the researcher can asking probing questions to get at the 
feelings, thoughts, and ideas that were or were not introduced during the group interaction and 
thereby begin to draw conclusions concerning the presence or absence of the signal provision of 
emotion among individuals. 
 Another future direction concerns the absence of several key individual difference 
variables in the proposed model.  As previously mentioned, the proposed model is not to be 
confused with a facet of or component of emotional intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  
However, this particular individual difference may have important implications for the degree to 
which the SPE is active within an individual.  It is likely that a person who is more sensitive to 
their own and others emotions (i.e. more emotionally intelligent) may be more likely to attend to 
the SPE.  As such, it could be that more emotionally intelligent individuals are more effective at 
detecting, acknowledging, and sharing their insights from the SPE with the group.  Future 
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research needs to dig into the theoretical connections between the SPE and emotional 
intelligence. 
Another individual difference variable that impacts group-level processing and 
intersubjective appraisal is emotional contagion (Barsade, 2002).  Emotional contagion is the 
“tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize expressions, vocalizations, postures, and 
movements with those of another person's and, consequently, to converge emotionally” 
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994, p. 5).  Barsade (2002) argued that group emotional 
contagion is the transfer of moods and emotions among group members.  The proposed model 
clearly argues that individuals need to attend to the emotion cues in their environment thereby 
experiencing more emotion in their intersubjective group appraisal processes.  It is likely that 
individual susceptibility to contagion as well as the extent to which group emotional contagion is 
present will impact the intersubjective appraisal of the anomalous event.  Future research should 
consider assessing the contagion processes that occur at the group-level as well as individual 
susceptibility to contagion in relation to the SPE.  It is likely that the deregulating of emotions in 
HROs will lead to more contagion processes as well as the SPE being more active in individuals. 
Future research may also consider the role of intuition in the decision making processes 
that characterize HROs. As Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) note, case studies and formal 
investigations often demonstrate that disasters emerge or are enlarged when members fail to act 
on intuitions that “something isn’t right” or, in the parlance of HRO theory, some abstract 
feelings indicate that a normal expectation about the organizational environment and/or 
operations is not being met. Although the empirical work on intuition in decision making (e.g., 
Khatri and Ng, 2000) is very limited, it generally indicates that intuition plays a strong role in 
decision processes in a range of organizational settings. Since disaster case analyses indicate that 
ENACTMENT AND EMOTION 
 
 
26 
intuitive feelings of danger are often ignored and not displayed, it makes sense to suspect that 
affective structure plays a role in dampening or sharpening the impact of intuition, However, 
given the very limited number of empirical investigations of intuition in decision making, more 
empirical work is needed in the future to provide an theoretical and empirical basis for theorizing 
the antecedents and outcomes of intuition focused emotion.   
Implications for Research 
As the foregoing propositions are investigated and receive some support, several 
implications for researchers of high reliability organizations become apparent.  First, our analysis 
illustrates the key importance of emotions when studying high reliability organizations.  
Although previous research has certainly entertained the idea that individuals and groups 
experience emotions in high reliability organizations (e.g. Katz, 1990; Scott and Myers, 2005), 
incorporating emotions into the theory and testing of theory concerning high reliability 
organizations is an area ripe for research.   
Second, assuming some of the propositions receive some support surrounding the focal 
importance of the signal provision of emotion, then researchers may need to subscribe to the 
adaptive and interpretive benefits of emotion.  While we have assumed an adaptive and 
interpretive approach to emotion experiences, others argue that emotions are problematic, 
irrational and thus conceptualize them pejoratively (Ekman, 2003).  The pejorative approach to 
emotion suggests that all emotion is the antithesis of rationality and must be controlled and 
managed (Putnam and Mumby, 1993). For example, military and paramilitary organizations 
(typically HRO’s) often take a pejorative approach to emotion, suggesting that emotions 
(particularly those other than anger) are irrational, inappropriate, and a source of individual and 
group vulnerability in emergency situations (Scott and Myers, 2005).  In contrast, we agree with 
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the adaptive approach which argues that emotions aid in the establishment of each individual’s 
place within their environment, pulling them toward certain people and pushing them away from 
others (Levenson, 1994). Levenson further asserts that emotions function as a “repository for 
innate and learned influences.” Rather than irrational and weak, emotions can serve adaptive 
functions by assisting in the recall of expectancies in diverse situations.  For example, a 
firefighter may experience a particular emotion or mixture thereof (e.g. fear, excitement, 
irritation, etc.) each time a particular type of emergency call occurs (e.g. freeway accident).  The 
emotion serves as an additional cue (i.e., SPE) to help the individual understand the expectations 
of the organization and his work group in that type of call.  Thus, under the conditions described 
in this article and as the propositions are confirmed, researchers may need to acknowledge the 
value of emotions in high risk occupations.  
Third, future research and theory can extend these ideas into the other facets of 
sensemaking theory (Weick, 1995).  Although the focus of this article was to bring emotion into 
the enactment of anomalous events, the processes of selection and retention may also be 
informed by emotion processes, including the signal provision of emotion.  For example, the 
stability of attention may be enhanced by the signal provision of emotion leading to a greater 
amount of information being selected by individuals and groups as they attempt to understand 
the meaning of the anomalous event.  There are a host of other variables connected to selection 
and retention (e.g. assembly rules, etc.) that may also provide insight into how emotions are 
involved in sensemaking. 
Although we have focused on the HRO context in which the stakes of missed signals of 
danger are much higher, the framework described here may be applied to other organizational 
contexts where other forms of danger figure more prominently. For example, as Waldron (2012) 
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suggests, emotion processes and the formal and informal feeling and display rules that constitute 
them may shape how individual make sense of the moral hazards of organizational life. Future 
work that explores these and other non-HRO settings in which emotion influences the appraisal 
of risk may be fruitful for expanding and enriching the extent to which sensemaking processes in 
a variety of organization types are shaped by affective structure.  
Implications for Practice 
 As these propositions are investigated, there are several potential implications for 
practice.  First, high reliability organizations are continually looking for ways to improve safety 
and reliability and modifying the formal and informal affective structure present in organizations 
may provide an individual and group level resource for doing just that.  There is considerable 
research on safety climate and culture indicating that the normative culture of the organization 
stimulates a positive or negative safety environment (e.g. Hoffman and Stetzer, 1998; Collinson, 
1999; Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000; Zohar, 2000).  As the many examples above illustrate, the 
constraining of the available emotional range may be problematic to high reliability 
organizations’ interested in maximizing the detection of weak signals and avoiding disastrous 
errors.  Although we do not mean to suggest that emotion could or should be completely 
unregulated, deregulating emotions by eliminating policies that promote singular emotional 
practices as well as making employees aware of the normative culture surrounding emotions 
(e.g., the heroic, stoic firefighter who ignores his feelings) may be one method of reducing near 
misses and accidents.  Specifically, organizations might consider training courses where 
employees’ role play situations where ambiguity is present and they are required to make 
decisions about which types of emotions to pay attention to and which to ignore.  Additionally, 
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building some sort of reward structure in such training programs where effective weak signal 
detection through emotions are recognized and rewarded. 
 Second, although reducing the constraints upon the signal provision of emotion is a 
necessary first step for high reliability organizations, leaders should consider activating and/or 
enhancing the SPE further.  For example, rather than just removing outdated formal affective 
structure (e.g. policies and standard operating procedures), high reliability organizations can 
encourage organizational members to express their concerns about behaviors in the 
organizational environment.  Rather than suppressing fear, firefighters should be encouraged to 
indicate when a situation looks uniquely dangerous (e.g., wary of entering the burning building 
due to structural integrity concerns).  Although firefighters are encouraged to express such 
concerns overtly, often informal normative processes within the firehouse discourage such 
behavior (Scott and Myers, 2005).  However, there is a difference between feeling and 
communicating fear or distress, and being overcome by it. As of now, many high reliability 
organizations do not distinguish between these two conditions—suggesting that feeling fear or 
talking about it is irrational and problematic. Organizational leaders can consider incorporating 
after-action-reviews where open discussion of both the good practices and questionable practices 
on a service call are discussed (Ellis and Mendel and Nir, 2006; Allen and Baran and Scott, 
2010).  The dangerous environments in which many high reliability organizations function make 
any method of reducing the overall time loss due to injury or death worth consideration. 
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